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Abstract: This paper addresses the governance of transitions to lower carbon cities. Drawing on both 
governmentality and neo-Gramscian perspectives, we chart and explore the diverse objects, 
subjects, means and ends evoked as governmental programs, or hegemonic projects in-the-making, 
are shaped to orchestrate urban carbon governance. We ask about the diversity of what is being 
sought through the governance of carbon in the city, how this is rendered and how carbon is being 
made to matter in the city. We do so through analysis of an audit of carbon governance initiatives in 
Australian cities, and a characterisation of these initiatives as four distinctive governmental 
programs. To make sense of the diverse ecology of initiatives revealed, we adopt a typological 
approach to suggest four distinctive governmental programs —Behaviour change; Demonstration; 
Transition; and Advocacy. We suggest that Australia’s emergent landscape of urban carbon 
governance both reproduces existing governance orderings and contains openings —via fragile 
emergent hegemonic projects—that might produce more transformative orderings: not least 
because of the demands and politics the low carbon subjects being invoked might be empowered to 
pursue but also because of the potential reconfiguration of the ‘integral state’ as new governmental 
programs are imagined and enacted.  
Key words: Urban carbon governance; Gramsci, Governmentality, hegemonies in-the-
making, Australia 
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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the practices, programs and projects through which the urban 
governance of carbon is being accomplished. Our aim is to further understandings of how 
transitions to lower carbon cities are being governed through examining the case of 
Australia. We focus on carbon governance as the explicit efforts directed towards 
decarbonising the city – usually driven from a concern to mitigate climate change, but also 
bound up with imperatives to diversify energy supply and integrate renewables into the 
energy system. Australia offers an intriguing context for this task. On the one hand, the 
political governance of climate, and of carbon in particular, has become mired in political 
contest and compromise (Howarth and Foxall, 2010). Yet on the other hand myriad actions 
organised by diverse actors, and operating across diverse spaces and scales, are shaping new 
modalities for carbon governance (Moloney et al, 2010; Jones, 2012). In terms of spatiality, 
Australia is no exception to the widely held observation that the city is being shaped as a 
crucial governable space for carbon (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2007; Hodson and Marvin, 2010). 
Our own audit of carbon governance initiatives in Australia’s capital cities, conducted under 
the Australian Research Council-funded Australia’s Cities and Carbon Reduction project (see 
section 3), revealed an ecology of nearly 900 initiatives involving state and non-state actors, 
working alone and in hybrid partnerships, acting across different domains, and through 
different modes. 
Making sense of this ecology of initiatives being enacted in and through the urban, our 
analysis adopts a typological approach to the governmental programs being shaped, which 
we categorise as Behaviour change; Demonstration; Transition; and Advocacy. As we 
elaborate below, they suggest differentiable rationalities or ‘wills to improve’ (Li, 2007)—or, 
in Gramscian terms, emergent hegemonic projects—reflected in the orchestration of varied 
arrangements of actors and mechanisms, subjects and objects of governance, and forms of 
knowledge. Our typology provides a framework within which we aim to chart empirical and 
theoretical concerns about the emergent logics and practices that are orchestrating urban 
carbon governance. We are led in the first instance to pose the broad but rather 
straightforward questions: What kinds of things are being sought through the governance of 
carbon in the city and how are these rendered? How, then, does carbon come to matter in 
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the city? And we build on these to speculate on two wider questions. First, how might the 
emergent practices and rationalities of carbon governance be implicated in reproducing 
existing governance orderings—is it being packaged into familiar forms and structures, 
practices and relationships and contributing to the maintenance of particular social 
formations? Second, and no less important, how might emergent logics and practices be 
capable of contributing to shaping new (potentially transformative) orderings of governance 
(see Perkins, 2011)? As such we are concerned with the question of hegemonies-in-the-
making.   
In exploring these questions our analysis draws together neo-Gramscian-informed insights 
with a governmentality analysis. The neo-Gramscian1 approach focuses on the processes and 
dynamic configurations involved in constituting and reproducing hegemonic governance 
forms, relations and purposes, while governmentality analysis aims to identify the logics and 
assemblage of practices (problematisations, mechanisms, subjectivisations) and entities 
through which governance towards particular ends is mobilised. Notwithstanding ontological 
differences between neo-Gramscian and Foucauldian perspectives we, like others (Jessop, 
2007; Li, 2007; Ekers and Loftus, 2008; Okereke et al, 2009; Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012), 
find this a productive theoretical ground for probing questions about the sedimented and 
shifting practices, processes, entities and relations through which urban carbon governance 
is being made (and remade).  
However, we avoid a tendency in both Gramscian and Foucauldian analyses to interrogate 
single hegemonic projects or governmental programs and to over-prescribe claims to the 
dominance of neoliberal rationality and ordering within them (see Walters, 2012). Rather we 
are interested in understanding the multiplicity through which urban carbon governance is 
being fashioned and orderings of carbon governance are being formulated. Resisting the 
homogenising effect of presuming emergent programs of urban carbon governance to be 
pervasively or exclusively neoliberal, these combined approaches can in fact be beneficial for 
recognising the variety of logics, techniques, objects and subjects being drawn together in 
                                                             
1
 Drawing on Morton (1999) and Levy and Newell (2002) we use the term ‘neo-Gramscian’ to refer to thinking 
in a Gramscian way rather than drawing on Gramsci in any doctrinaire sense. A neo-Gramscian approach draws 
on Gramscian notions in ways that are significant to present problems and that can be combined with other 
intellectual frameworks.   
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emergent governmental programs or hegemonic projects. Applied to our audit of carbon 
governance initiatives, a neo-Gramscian/governmentality framework helps to tease out the 
varieties of ways of governing carbon at work and, in a wider sense, contribute to the 
identification of different interests, rationalities and orderings in the making. 
We begin by developing the argument for a neo-Gramscian and governmentality approach, 
bringing these perspectives together to think about urban carbon governance as a suite of 
inter-related governmental programs or hegemonic projects in-the-making. We then use this 
approach to analyse the programs we identify as emerging in Australia’s urban carbon 
governance, drawing out aspects of their rationality and practice, and the alignments of 
objects and subjects they mobilise. We conclude with critical reflections on the diverse 
political work they attempt and with speculations on their capacities both to sediment 
existing governing orderings and to contribute towards the formation of transformative 
governance possibilities that may be both entangled with and exceed neoliberal governance 
forms.    
2. Hegemonic projects in-the-making: governmental programs and urban carbon 
governance 
As global environmental governance has been fashioned through attempts to create 
marketised governance regimes,social science analyses have, understandably,  focused 
heavily on the production of carbon as a commodity and its subsequent neoliberalised 
governance through carbon economies and enrolment in circuits of accumulation (Böhm 
and Dabhi, 2009; Bailey et al, 2011; Newell et al, 2012). Important as the political work done 
by this mode of carbon governance is, we wish to argue that carbon does more and different 
political work through diverse means, including work that speaks to the maintenance and 
reproduction of wider structures and systems and, potentially, their transformation. Such an 
argument requires caution against overvaluing neoliberal forms, modes and purposes of 
governance, thus producing reductive analysis in which the co-presence of other ways of 
governing and transformations in the objects, subjects, means and ends of government 
cannot easily be discerned (Walters, 2012). 
The emergence of the city as a governmental space for carbon, then poses intriguing 
questions around the multiplicity of what is sought through the governance of carbon, of 
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how carbon is made to matter in the city and of what might it do in different contexts. Rice’s 
(2010) analysis provides a productive point from which to consider these concerns. 
Focussing on Seattle, Rice explores how climate and carbon are harnessed to do political 
work in the city. She argues that the local state reproduces its governmental authority and 
exercises its political power by drawing on climate as a central focus for urban policy. It 
makes climate governable through carbon, primarily applying techniques of inventory and 
accounting that monitor and control carbon emissions from urban activities and link them to 
particular territories that match the territorial logic of the state, reinscribing state 
institutions’ boundaries and governing capacity. For Rice, these steps of climatization, 
carbonization and territorialisation enable the mobilization of state authority and political 
power through governing carbon, by creating and enrolling responsibilized carbon-relevant 
citizens as governable environmental subjects. 
Here we extend Rice’s (2010) insightful analysis in two directions. First, we argue that carbon 
is understood and made relevant to the workings of urban government—or in Rice’s term, 
that urban government is carbonized—in a variety of ways that exceed the territorialised 
accounting mechanisms that are the focus of her account. This demands receptivity to the 
multiplicity of carbon governance. That is, it requires recognition of the multiple ways in 
which carbon is related to the city and rendered governable, beyond notions of carbon 
economies and related accounting metrics2. Second, and relatedly, we argue that 
understanding urban governance of (and through) carbon requires us, explicitly, to view ‘the 
state’ and its powers of rule as distributed (Ekers and Loftus, 2008; Okereke et al, 2009), 
accepting the wide array of entities through which the urban governance of carbon is 
achieved. In governing carbon, states (attempt to) orchestrate relations with non-state 
actors in the private sector and civil society to achieve governmental objectives  through an 
array of political practices of shared governance that extend beyond relations of coercion 
and contract (see Li, 2007; Perkins, 2009). Such orchestration necessitates contending with 
the lack of unity of purpose, the diverse logics and wills and the incompatibilities across the 
                                                             
2
 Indeed Rice’s analysis is sympathetic to this. She acknowledges that “state power is expressed in diverse ways 
through many sites of governance….[so] a more nuanced look at state practice, particularly as it occurs through 
the most routine and everyday activities of local governments, might shed light on the state–nature 
relationship being expressed through new subnational climate change programs”(2010:930) . 
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actors and entities involved in governing. So we are left with a dynamic view of states as 
heterogeneous and constructed, and as porous, processual and relational in character 
(McGuirk and O’Neill, 2012). But beyond this, viewing states’ powers of rule as distributed 
also means taking a wider view of governing authority. It means accepting that legitimate 
governing authority may be generated ‘outside’ states through processes of authorisation 
generated through the process of governing (Bulkeley, 2012).   
In bringing Neo-Gramscian thinking together with Foucauldian governmentality, we mobilise 
Walters’ (2012) characterisation of governmentality as a cluster of concepts and hypotheses 
that is open to dynamic extension and to productive combination with other conceptual 
frameworks, to develop new ways of considering contemporary governance issues. Despite 
generative tensions around the concepts of power, ‘the social’ and the nature of struggle 
(Ekers and Loftus 2008)3, aligning governmentality and neo-Gramscian perspectives can 
provide the wider theoretical prism needed to take forward the analysis we seek to 
progress. As we elaborate below, this alignment takes us beyond conventional networked 
understandings of urban governance. It provides insight into how carbon governance is 
enacted, practically and materially, and specifying the diverse and changing ways 
mechanisms, objects and subjects are articulated through governance practice.  It remains 
receptive to the multiple orderings taking shape in governing carbon and the competing 
logics and relations that underlie them. Moreover, in recognising the distributed nature of 
rule, it overcomes problematic state/non-state distinctions in understanding how 
governance capacity and authority is realised (Buttigieg, 1995; Walters, 2012). 
 
A Foucauldian governmentality approach understands government as responding to 
distinctive problematics in need of ‘improvement’ (Foucault, 2009, 105). Government 
centres on ‘the conduct of conduct’; that is, directing subjects’ behaviours in line with a set 
of norms or ethics towards a variety of ends (Dean, 1999). This requires distinct rationalities 
or mentalities which provide visions of the ‘right manner of disposing things’ (Li, 2007, p.6), 
organising institutional spaces and the conduct of populations in line with specific aims and 
objectives (Raco and Imrie 2000, p. 2190). In their turn, rationalities frame or problematise 
                                                             
3
 In the limited space available we do not attempt to explore the tensions between Foucault’s poststructural 
and Gramsci’s Marxian forms of theorising. We align with Ekers and Loftus’ (2008) reading of these tensions as 
generative and reconcilable, while noting that Barnett (2005) finds them incommensurable. 
 7 
the objects to be governed, gather forms of knowledge that make these objects discernable 
and known in particular ways. Ultimately, rationalities suggest the mechanisms or 
technologies of governance through which the ‘right disposition of things’ might be achieved 
(Rose, 1996; Paterson and Stripple, 2010). Effective government, then, relies heavily on 
ensuring the ‘self-government’ of relevant actors by shaping subjects who enact 
governmental objectives by conducting themselves in accordance with rationalities, 
knowledges and norms aligned with governmental ends (Dean, 1999, pp. 10-11, and see 
Rutland and Ayett, 2008).   
This perspective attends to the programmatic nature of attempts to govern economic, social 
and environmental domains in line with governmental objectives. Yet it is also adept at 
identifying how any program of government is “not the product of a singular intention or 
will. It draws upon and is situated within a heterogeneous assemblage” of artefacts, 
knowledge, material relations, authority, agency and so on (Li, 2007, p. 6; and see Dean, 
1999). Programs are governmental assemblages, then, made up of multiple elements that 
will not have a fully coherent or unitary purpose, but will contain incompatibilities and 
multiplicities (Larner, 2006; Bulkeley et al, 2007). Indeed, any domain of government—
economic, social, environmental—is likely to be populated by overlapping rationalities 
where hybrid logics, practices and mechanisms co-exist, rubbing up against each other in 
sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory ways (McGuirk, 2005; Lockwood and 
Davison, 2010). 
While many studies of governmentality have focused on neoliberal aspects of government, 
this is far from the limit of governmentalities in play (Walters, 2012). When attuned to the 
hybrid rationalities and heterogeneous assemblages at work in the name of government, 
governmentality perspectives are highly productive for revealing the multiple rationalities 
driving the government of urban carbon, the diversity of knowledge forms, devices and 
techniques through which carbon is related to the city, and the array of mechanisms that 
align material relations to induce and enable self-governance or ‘ the conduct of carbon 
conduct’ (see Paterson and Stripple, 2010). Certainly, we find such perspectives suggestive 
for thinking about how carbon is related to the city in a variety of ways that extend beyond 
the ‘technologies of performance’ of carbon accounting (Dean, 1999; Okereke et al, 2009) 
and, following this, beyond the habitual association of such technologies with a 
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marketised/neoliberal rationality (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). Pursuing this line of 
thinking opens up the question of the varied political work that governmentalities of carbon 
might seek to accomplish. Neo-Gramscian thinking further enables this line of analysis, 
providing additional dimensions and a conceptual enrichment that can work alongside a 
governmentality approach.  
Apart from Gramsci’s central notion of hegemony providing a useful way of understanding 
how politically contested organisational fields—such as carbon governance—might be 
stabilised (Levy and Newell, 2002), two related dimensions of a neo-Gramsican approach, 
both of which chime with Foucauldian approaches, are particularly valuable. While 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality as dispersed rule does not commence with the state, it 
does resonate with Gramsci’s notion of the integral state as a source of government (Ekers 
and Loftus, 2008). For Gramsci all institutions, whether formally public or private, which 
enable the exercise of power by dominant groups are seen as components of the state 
which, in turn is conceived of as ``a complex ensemble of institutions, organisations and 
forces'' (Jessop 1997, p.52). A Gramscian perspective, then, attends to the fluid boundaries 
between formal state institutions and civic society, between state and non-state actors that 
combine in shaping institutions of urban governance. It further attends to the way that 
power can be consolidated and sedimented in institutions habitually thought of as ‘outside’ 
of states (Ekers and Loftus, 2008). This view of states (and their powers of rule), not as 
bounded but as complex and dynamic systems of strategic selectivity, draws analytical 
attention to the configurations of actors, practices, discourses and relations that are aligned 
through processes of negotiation and compromise as part generating a collective will to 
govern (McGuirk, 2004).  
Neo-Gramscian thinking gives us a processual understanding of states, in which states are 
comprised through the enactment of governing. This processual focus—though highly 
resonant with Foucault’s emphasis on the practices of governing—arguably takes us further 
than the emphasis in governmentality studies on the intent of governmental rationalities as 
discursively reflected in texts, policies, manuals, and the governmental assemblages these 
leverage (Barnett, 2005; Walters, 2012). From a neo-Gramscian perspective, the capacity to 
govern cannot be assured by intent, and so analytical attention settles on how that capacity 
must be accomplished through activating specific conjunctures of social, economic, and 
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political forces in situated, lived practice (McGuirk, 2004). Thus the focus for analysis is the 
actual political practices of governing as they occur across state and non-state, public and 
private domains and how these achieved through practical means (rather than on more 
abstract imaginaries of governance/power as imposed) (Ekers and Loftus, 2008). The neo-
Gramscian approach, of course, also poses the critical questions of how, by and for whom 
governing is accomplished (see Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012).  
The second dimension of a neo-Gramsican approach that is especially productive for our 
analysis is the concept of hegemonic projects. Gramsci’s notion of the integral state suggests 
that any unity has to be achieved, can only be provisional and ‘is likely to be multi-centred 
and tied into diverse sets of relations with ‘external’ actors’ (Murdoch and Ward, 1997, 
p.311). But these alignments are not accomplished through any singular or static governance 
ordering but rather through dynamic assemblages of ‘hegemonic projects’ operating in 
different arenas through multiple pathways. These projects—like governmental programs—
enable governing to be achieved ‘practically’ through the alignment of social and material 
elements and entities (Li, 2007; Ekers and Loftus, 2008). Such projects can be thought of as 
aiming to scope out, order and regulate domains of practice towards particular governance 
objectives (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 400–402).  
The likelihood of parallel hegemonic projects resonates strongly with Foucault’s notion of 
multiple governmental programs guided by distinctive rationalities. These projects provide 
the frames and practical means through which dispersed social and material elements and 
sites might be articulated together to organise institutional spaces and behaviours in line 
with specific aims and objectives (see Ekers et al, 2009). This process of alignment is a crucial 
means through which governing takes shape, constituting (state and non-state) 
subjectivities, authority and the objects and subjects to be governed (Bulkeley and 
Schroeder, 2012). To be effective, however, hegemonic projects have to be enacted and 
attain ideological acceptance in real, material contexts; they are never settled. Rather than 
focus on the potentialities or intentions of hegemonic projects, a neo-Gramscian perspective 
on carbon governance requires an understanding of the ways projects are performed and 
made practically effective and through which they forge alignments of entities, objects and 
subjects through which the governance of carbon is enacted.  
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This draws us again, in neo-Gramscian fashion, to investigating the actualities involved in the 
emergence of new hegemonic projects around the governance of carbon (see Ekers and 
Loftus, 2008): what is aspired to in particular projects; what capacities are mobilized to enact 
this; which objects are worked upon; what subjects are enrolled; and through what practices 
and techniques. In keeping with our intention to extend Rice’s (2010) contribution, we might 
expect emergent hegemonic projects around the urban governance of carbon to operate 
across state/non-state actors and across diverse and interrelated arenas of the city and its 
social relations; arenas that reach across the private/individual and the public/collective, the 
household and the organizational, across everyday life and work and the structural and 
infrastructural, and across the social and the economic. Likewise, we might expect diverse 
techniques and mechanisms that extend well beyond neoliberal, marketised techniques of 
carbon accounting and that go about shaping different and varied forms of relation between 
the city and carbon. 
In the analysis that follows we draw on this discussion to examine the variable ways in which 
urban carbon governance is being made (and remade) in the Australian city, through 
multiple political practices and ongoing processes of alignment (of actors, interests, objects, 
subjects and mechanisms) that extend beyond any fixed notion of the state, and that 
problematise carbon and relate it to the city in differing ways. Governance thus actively 
evokes hegemonic projects/governmental programs that are, inevitably, processual; always 
in the making (see Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012). Thus we are mindful, first, of exploring 
the range of techniques and mechanisms, subjects and objects that are acted through and 
upon in these emergent projects: those that work through market logics and means and 
through other modalities. Second, we are also sensitised to the way the objects and subjects 
of governance are constituted in response to particular problematics that are themselves 
rendered through hegemonic projects or governmental programs. As Ekers and Loftus 
(2008) remind us, the governing power of states and dominant social interests is habitually 
produced and reproduced through hegemonic projects and the constituent rationalities and 
technologies that (selectively) align and assemble diverse entities to achieve their aims (and 
see Perkins, 2011; Ekers et al, 2009).  
3. Ecologies of Urban Carbon Governance in Australia 
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Australia offers an intriguing context in which to analyse the urban governance of carbon 
and the ways governance practice brings carbon into relation with the city. Australia’s 
competitive advantage has relied on plentiful cheap energy (especially coal) and location in 
the lucrative Asia-Pacific energy markets and this presents a difficult profile from the 
perspective of climate governance (Williams and Booth, 2013). Fossil-fuel based energy 
production underpins Australia’s urban-economic system and a long history of cheap energy, 
water and land has shaped an urban environment that embeds high emissions lifestyles. 
National climate governance reflects both the reluctance to dislodge the country’s fossil-fuel 
dependence and a fractious climate politics in which environment and economy are pitted 
against each other (Curran 2009; Kythreotis, 2012). The policy vacuum created by the lack of 
a coherent national climate response during the 1990s and 2000s evoked public frustration 
and led state governments, especially in NSW and Victoria, to take a leadership role through 
the development of their own climate change strategies and measures4. Simultaneously 
urban-based local governments have emerged as internationally networked climate activists 
(Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2009; Jones, 2012). Some of the most advanced carbon 
management strategies have been put in place within the local government sector5. Urban 
local governments’ active role in an unsettled landscape of multilevel, overlapping and often 
short-lived governance efforts6 has seen them undertake innovative and experimental 
initiatives and projects, often in partnership with other LGAs, community and non-
government organisations (Zeppel, 2012). Alongside this, an uneven landscape of initiatives 
by businesses and NGOs has emerged reflecting the plural and particular stake-holder 
interests of diverse sectors.   
The diversity and densely interwoven nature of urban carbon governance represents 
something of a challenge for both governmentality and neo-Gramscian approaches, which 
have tended to rely on methodologies that focus on the in-depth exploration and excavation 
of single cases, institutions, or governmental programs or on identifying wide social forces 
operating at global to local scales in the constitution of hegemonic projects. Yet our 
                                                             
4
 The introduction of the Federal Government’s Clean Energy Future climate change plan in 2011 attempted to 
fashion a coherent framework, yet is being dismantled by the Coalition government elected in 2013. 
5
 The Australian governance system has no metropolitan-scaled governing authorities. Multiple local 
governments govern the major cities with more strategic metro-scaled governing responsibilities being in the 
hands of the various state governments. 
6
 The Productivity Commission (2011) found 230 emissions reductions policies operating in Australia. 
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contention is that both approaches also signal the importance of attending to the practical, 
material and mundane ways in which governing is accomplished, such that the techniques, 
objects and subjects of government are not merely the working through of pre-determined 
rationalities but come to constitute the project of government itself. This suggests that 
alternative methodological approaches, less historical in orientation, can also provide insight 
into the workings of government, by identifying the ways in which (in this case) the urban 
arena is coming to be regarded as an object to be governed, the techniques and tactics 
deployed to achieve this, and the forms of subjectivity that are being engendered through 
such processes. We designed our research methodology to capture the ways in which these 
objects, techniques and subjectivities were being ordered and sustained across Australian 
urban contexts, through the use of an audit of initiatives to capture the broad overview of 
the forms which governmental programs in this arena were taking (the subject of analysis 
here), as well as to explore in depth the workings of particular programs through examining 
the micro-politics and practices of case-studies (which we analyse elsewhere).  
Our audit of carbon governance initiatives across Australia’s capital cities7, conducted over 
2011 and 2012, surveyed the landscape formed through the workings of programs to govern 
carbon. The audit revealed a veritable ecology of almost 900 urban-based initiatives 
contributing to the urban governance of carbon, with diverse lineages, operating on diverse 
scales, with varying intents and through varying modalities. Initiatives were regarded as 
undertaking carbon governance where they made explicit mention that their intended 
purpose was either to reduce the use of carbon-based energy or to develop alternative 
energy sources. Initiatives were regarded as ‘urban’ where they identified particular urban 
communities or entities as in need of intervention or where they sought to undertake 
decarbonisation on behalf of particular urban constituencies, for example where a local 
authority might undertake a demonstration project to establish the potential for action 
within their community. 
                                                             
7
 The web-based audit covered Australia’s state and territory capital cities: Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, 
Perth, Adelaide, Hobart, Darwin and Canberra. We focused on a geographically stratified sample of 57 local 
government authorities (LGAs) as our initial entry point, and extended from this through a network approach 
which commenced with NGOs and private sector actors involved in partnerships with LGAs, following through 
their connections to other initiatives, both alone and in other partnerships. We supplemented this with an 
additional analysis of NGOs and private sector actors known to be involved in carbon reduction action, 
extending from this also with a network approach.  Finally we undertook an analysis based on key sectors (e.g 
tourism, finance) where industry peak organisations and individual corporate actors are known to be active. 
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Broad coding in terms of their dominant purpose showed that these initiatives operated 
across the domains of energy (47%), buildings (32%) and transport (21%). Local governments 
dominated as initiators (57%) of the various schemes, but NGOs (12%), other community 
based organisations (12%) and corporations (9%) also had a recognizable presence. Local 
governments were also dominant as initiative funders (65%), with state governments (19%), 
NGOs (14%), other community-based organisations (11%) and corporations (8%) also active 
in funding. Nearly 52% of initiatives did not involve partners, but the 48% that did have 
partners were diversely constituted by local governments (23%) and corporations (22%) and, 
less often, state governments (16%), NGOs (9%) and community groups (8%). Initiatives 
predominantly acted upon households (60%), but also targeted their own organisations 
(33%) and businesses (14%). And they operated primarily through enabling mechanisms8 
(86%) (e.g. technological innovations, information sharing, education schemes, network 
building); but also drew on provision mechanisms (34%) (e.g. providing new (usually small-
scale) infrastructure, providing a free service); market mechanisms (21%) (e.g. purchase 
agreements, financial incentives, subsidies); and regulatory mechanisms (17%), though these 
were very predominantly ‘soft’ or voluntary forms (e.g. voluntary targets or standards, 
performance evaluation tools). 
Our aim here is not to excavate how these programs are actualised or how they are 
experienced: this is not achievable through a survey methodology in any case. Rather the 
contribution of this paper is to consider the multiple forms of governing carbon that are 
emerging, and how these various wills to improve are manifest through the objects 
subjected to improvement, the subjects enrolled and the mechanisms and techniques 
mobilised to enact improvement. To make sense of this ecology in these terms, we adopt a 
typological approach. We do not intend this categorization to be comprehensive nor to 
exhaust the possibilities of the emergent governance landscape. We acknowledge that there 
are multiple possibilities through which hegemonic carbon projects of governmental 
programs might form. Yet we would argue that not all are equally likely to emerge: there will 
be selectivity or ‘constitutive exclusions’ involved (Li, 2007). Hence our categorization arises 
from the iteration of the theoretical and conceptual precepts of our neo-Gramscian and 
Foucauldian framework with the empirical findings of our audit. We do not mean to suggest 
                                                             
8
 Categorisation of mechanisms is derived from Bulkeley and Kerns (2006). 
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that there are radical disjunctures between the categories of the typology. We take their 
boundaries to be relatively fluid and porous, as befits the concepts of heterogeneous social, 
material and political alignments, provisionality and accomplishment that inform our 
understanding of governance. These categories are likely to involve cross-cutting entities 
and actors, mechanisms and knowledge forms, and sometimes to share objects and 
subjects, though in distinctive alignments and guided by distinctive rationalities or visions. 
Yet at the same time, we find that there are distinct ways in which the objects, techniques, 
and subjects of carbon government are related to one another and to particular agencies 
that are seeking to govern carbon in Australia’s urban context.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The character of each form of governmental program/project is outlined in Table 1, in terms 
of their actors/initiators, the subjects and objects they work on and through, and the 
mechanisms through which they are enacted. As Table 1 illustrates, while each may draw on 
some of the same elements, we find four distinct alignments that are suggestive of different 
programs/projects operating across this landscape. They are: (i) Behaviour change; 
initiatives aimed to work on individuals, households or organisations seeking forms of self-
conduct and new forms of carbon responsibilities and, thus, shaping subjects, constituencies 
and markets (ii) Demonstration; initiatives aiming to test and display technological or social 
innovations for carbon reduction from which wider learning and/or adoption may result; (iii) 
Transition; initiatives working to imagine and generate alternative policy formations, or 
material structures, or to enable different lower carbon social formations and practices; and 
(iv) Advocacy; initiatives working with existing maps of policy domains and approaches to 
improve their efficacy for carbon reduction.  These visions however are neither closed, nor 
fixed. As the products of heterogeneous alignments, their status is in-the-making; they are 
open to being developed in further directions.  
3.1 Behaviour Change  
Behaviour change initiatives have an intent or a ‘will to improve’ on carbon emissions 
through attempting to ‘conduct the carbon conduct’ (see Paterson and Stripple, 2010). Such 
attempts deeply permeate Australia’s urban carbon governance. Of all initiatives in our 
audit, nearly 60% had an identified behavioural change intent.  Behaviour change addresses 
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the problematic of carbon reduction by enrolling urban householders and individuals into 
processes through which they take personal account of their carbon emissions. These 
governance initiatives straddle a broad spectrum of mechanisms, though are primarily 
characterised by enabling mechanisms aiming to educate and inform willing householders, 
through educative practices such as information provision, both in active (e.g. workshops) 
and more latent forms (e.g. leaflets, brochures). Though less prominent, market mechanisms 
such as financial incentives (e.g. subsidies, incentives), and the provision of an array services, 
particularly carbon accounting mechanisms, also provide material supports to enrolling 
individual subjects.  
 In this context, managing carbon behaviour focuses on building a consensus around 
achieving a generalised reduction in energy demand (and by implication in carbon 
generation), rather than a systemic shift to renewable and therefore low- or no-carbon 
forms of energy. The principal focus of households and travellers as the subjects of these 
initiatives is reflected in the fact that, while initiatives with a behaviour change intent 
operate across the material domains of energy infrastructure, buildings and transport, they 
are particularly dominant in those focused on buildings, whereby householders are 
encouraged to reduce energy demand in their homes, integrating the governmental intent 
with the material practices of everyday lives. Notably though, where initiatives target the 
domain of transport, it is individual mobility (replacing car use with other individual modes 
like bicycles) rather than mass transit that is the focus. On the whole, then, behaviour 
change is a governmental program that seeks to shape conduct using existing rather than 
new technologies, using expert/technical knowledge to generate information (e.g. via 
carbon accounting techniques) as a foundation for activities that promote reductions in 
energy demand rather than, for example, generating new knowledge or technologies that 
might have a more systemically transformative capability.  
Local governments, or groups of local governments, dominate as the initiators of these 
schemes sometimes supported by other levels of the state, funding the local delivery of 
these initiatives. In Gramscian terms, we might interpret this as local authorities working to 
achieve the consent of their residents to help accomplish governmental objectives through 
behaviour change programs (see Rice, 2010). We also can observe that when local 
governments extend beyond their conventional involvement in education/information 
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provision or various forms of regulation, to engage in techniques deploying a market logic 
(e.g. financial mechanisms or carbon accounting), they strategically enrol additional capacity, 
particularly through partnerships with private sector actors as they seek to work with new 
ways of governing behaviour. Notably, our audit suggests that in initiatives with a behaviour 
change intent, partnerships with the corporate sector are substantially more common than 
with the NGO sector. Nonetheless, local authorities are core actors in this hetereogeneously-
assembled governmental project, creating a space not only in which to manage urban 
carbon practices, but to create carbon-reducing subjects (see Agrawal, 2005). In this 
instance, local governments do not so much assert authority as generate it through 
residents’ embrace of governing of their own emissions. In the Australian urban context, as 
these knowledges and technologies extend to forms including market logics and accounting 
techniques, the constituency of the ‘integral state’ expands selectively to include private 
sector actors.   
As initiatives across Australian cities seek to shape carbon-reducing subjects, these are 
unlikely to be subjects activated, motivated and enabled to transform the energy and 
transport infrastructures of the city. The governmental program driven by a behaviour 
change rationality connects carbon primarily to the energy demands of urban householders 
and commuters, seeking to manage energy demand, and hence emissions generation, within 
existing energy and transport infrastructure configurations and the existing constellation of 
interests vested in these configurations. Notably too, in primarily targeting the carbon 
conduct of households in and around their homes, this hegemonic project in-the-making 
pays less attention to enrolling business and production interests to the project of governing 
the conduct of carbon conduct. Rather behaviour change suggests a real form of politics that 
responds to, and potentially reworks, both the jurisdictional and authority limits of its 
primarily local government initiators and the contested ground of climate policy in Australia. 
3.2 Demonstration  
Demonstration is a pedagogical governmentality, governing low carbon urban transitions 
through experiential, material learning. Through demonstration, an artefact is shown to 
multiple audiences, often relying ‘exhibiting a technological device in action’ (Rosenthal, 
2005, p.346) or promoting or selling a technology (Markusson et al, 2011, p. 294). 
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Exhibitions, according to Whitehead (2009) represent how things could and should work in 
an holistic and material way. As part of a broader set of pedagogies, exhibitions use moral 
and economic persuasion in conjunction with producing and circulating new knowledge and 
social networks around a technology. Socio-material engagements, as facilitated by 
demonstration, are governmental in that they bring practical technologies to a wider 
audience and, in the process, ‘allow the people to know and thence to regulate themselves’ 
(Whitehead, 2009, p.72), through facilitating experience and learning.  
Governing urban carbon through demonstration is not as widespread in our audit as 
behaviour change (just less than 10% of initiatives). However its significance as a distinctive 
governmental program lies in its state-led nature, its partnership approach, technological 
innovation, and its combination of provision alongside enabling mechanisms promoting self-
governance and behaviour change. In our audit, the heterogeneous initiatives engaged in 
demonstration are most often led by government and are likely to be constituted through 
partnerships, most commonly between different scales of government: local, state and 
federal. This often reflects a funding relationship, indicative of Australian local governments’ 
funding dependence on higher tiers of government. Partnerships with corporate and 
industry actors are also common, these being much more often involved as partners in 
demonstration projects than across the audit as a whole. Comparatively there is relatively 
little involvement from NGO or community actors, reflecting the overwhelming engagement 
with technological innovation in demonstration initiatives and thus the level of investment 
required of governing through demonstration.  
Reflecting their technological focus, demonstration initiatives have a strong focus on the 
materiality of buildings9. Indeed the subject of governance in demonstration initiatives is 
most often the initiating (predominantly government) organization itself, and particularly its 
premises; this being twice as likely in demonstration initiatives than across the audit as a 
whole. Thus, as a governmental program, demonstration is dominated by government-led 
initiatives, operating on government organisations and particularly deploying government 
premises as the material vehicle of demonstration (e.g. low-carbon local government office 
buildings or amenities, government-sponsored demonstration homes). However, 
                                                             
9
 Notwithstanding a small number of well-funded demonstration initiatives focused on energy infrastructure 
such as the Federally-funded SmartGrid Smart City initiative. 
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highlighting the processual nature of the state, the prominence of partnership with private 
sector actors points to the centrality of private sector capacities (for example expertise, 
technological innovation, finance, or additional services for calculating initiatives’ benefits) 
to realising government objectives for governing itself (self-governance) as well promoting 
wider adoption of preferred technologies.  
Demonstration initiatives are orchestrated by mechanisms of provision, especially of new 
forms of infrastructure (e.g. solar panels on buildings, LED lighting on public amenities), 
much more so than across the audit as a whole. This provision provides a means of testing 
out technological innovations as well as the capacity to build consensus on the legitimacy of 
such innovations through leading by example. Enabling mechanisms were also very widely 
deployed in nearly all demonstration initiatives. Though, in contrast to the less direct means 
of enabling that characterise behaviour change (eg information sharing), they tended to 
enable through direct means such as furnishing technical capacity and expert knowledge. 
Through these direct forms of provision and enabling, then, demonstration works as a driver 
of technological innovation; being twice as likely to involve technological innovation as 
initiatives across the audit. Such innovation can create new patterns of production and 
consumption at demonstration sites and generate new expert knowledge and technological 
capacity (indeed demonstration initiatives were twice as likely as initiatives across the audit 
as a whole to involve generating information and research) but it may also create new 
norms to induce wider organisational adoption of technological interventions. However, 
with some notable exceptions10, demonstration initiatives appeared largely self-contained 
and generally involved limited explicit attention to how to make demonstrations work within 
wider infrastructural or social networks (see Moloney et al, 2010). The material 
demonstration itself, reinforced by new knowledge and technical capacity, is relied upon to 
legitimise the innovations, leaving this mode of urban carbon governance vulnerable to 
being unable to cohere the social and material alignments needed to realise governmental 
objectives.  
 
                                                             
10
 Here we refer to a small number of federally-funded urban demonstration projects such as Solar Cities and 
Smart Grid Smart City which have explicit briefs of testing how technological innovations can be shaped for 
wider implementation. Nonetheless, the emphasis in these projects is on technological and market 
implementation rather than the social challenges of implementation.  
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Demonstration, then, relates carbon to the city technologically, deploying technological 
intervention as the means to reduce emissions. Demonstration seeks both to normalise the 
integration of both energy-efficient and renewable energy technologies through their testing 
and exhibition. Neo-Gramscian thinking leads us to expect hegemonic projects, like 
governmental programs, to be selective, enabling some interests, instruments and 
objectives to be more easily drawn together and institutionalised than others (McGuirk 
2004). Indeed, this is the case here, whereby the particular technological mode of relating 
carbon to the urban is inducing a selectivity around the sites, subjects and partners involved: 
shaped at least in part by the investment demands of significant technological 
demonstration capacity. Connecting to demonstration projects may allow actors to leverage 
strategic advantage or seek to generate political capital. While the wider learning that might 
be leveraged from the materiality of demonstration and new knowledges initiatives may 
generate might be open-ended, the strategic advantages to be accrued currently remain 
centred on state and private sector actors who dominate in demonstration initiatives. 
Arguably, these initiatives are crucial to establishing the market viability of new carbon-
reducing technologies, and stand to yield significant strategic advantages to the private 
sector actors involved. Again this suggests that meeting the governmental objectives of 
demonstration, and cohering the social alignments necessary to this, is likely to require 
techniques to build the legitimacy and wider societal benefits of the technologies at the 
heart of demonstration initiatives. 
 
3.3 Transition   
As with demonstration, initiatives aimed at governing through transition made up 10% of 
our audit, yet what distinguishes this as a governmental program the holistic vision for 
transition to low carbon cities. We can differentiate two sub-types of transition initiatives 
undertaken by distinctive sets of actors and guided by distinctive visions. First are 
community-based efforts to transform daily life and its energy requirements such as the 
Transition Towns movement. These are supported by a loose network of community-based 
organisations in which information is shared and a common approach used as a foundation 
for collective local action. These initiatives seek to bring into being a ‘proto low carbon 
society’, in which new forms of social organization and social relations are built around 
lowering the use of carbon resources. The second are purposeful, large-scale interventions 
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like the Federally-funded Solar Cities program. This program supported a series of urban-
based consortia of local governments with energy, finance and land corporations to trial the 
large-scale urban integration of solar energy, new grid-based technologies, alternative 
technologies for electricity storage and consumption, and energy efficiency measures, to 
showcase efficiency gains and test social and market viability. These interventions tend to be 
based on public-private partnerships, with a strong state presence. Federal government 
started a third of all of these initiatives, with business and local government as co-initiators 
and many actors as partners. Here, we can see a form of ‘proto low carbon economy’ 
emerging, in which initiatives aim to bring forward new forms of market organization and 
transactions, business models and forms of economy that are built on alternative systems of 
energy provision. In both sub-types, the focus is on facilitating shifts—both small and large 
scale—towards establishing alternative hegemonies based on renewable energy, new forms 
of energy services to manage demand, and related low carbon living.  
Unlike in the governmental programs of behaviour change and demonstration, local 
governments are not key drivers of transition initiatives. While federal government-initiated, 
private sector-driven transition initiatives can be understood as the dominant type of 
transition initiative, numerically at least community actors are the more prominent initiators 
through such maniform initiatives as Transition Towns and 100% Renewables11 which are 
replicated in urban areas across the country. For transition as a governmental program, 
across both sub-types, partnership is absolutely central, reflecting initiatives’ heterogeneous 
forms and holistic visions and the array of actors, capacities and material practices that need 
to be aligned to engender these aspirations. All levels of government are engaged as 
important partners and, while still playing a minor role, transnational networks, foundations, 
and corporations are involved more often than in the audit as a whole. Not surprisingly given 
the governmental intent, the dominant material focus—the object of governance—is energy 
infrastructure. As the scope of transition governmentalities might suggest, the main subjects 
of governance are households, yet businesses are also a substantial focus. And, unlike 
behaviour change or demonstration, transition—taken as a set of initiatives—combines a 
focus on both technological and social innovation in households and business practices. 
                                                             
11
 A community organising campaign aiming to connect and support local groups working towards a renewable 
energy future. 
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As might be intuited from their strong basis in community organisations, regulatory 
mechanisms are rarely used in transition initiatives. Market mechanisms are used to some 
degree, in the form for instance of subsidies. But it is enabling mechanisms that, again, are 
overwhelmingly deployed, though in distinctive patterns that map onto the two sub-types 
identified initially. Community-driven initiatives, reflecting the web-like form of their 
organisation and connection, deploy outwardly focussed enabling mechanisms such as 
information provision, education and networking facilitation. By contrast, the government-
supported, larger-scaled transition initiatives deploy enabling, but in combination with 
provision mechanisms. They use technological enablement, based on generating expert 
knowledge and demonstration to establish and promote the (social and market) feasibility of 
new energy systems and they provide new technologies, systems and services (eg smart 
tariffs, solar hot water, EV charge points). 
Transition, then, is a diffuse, deeply heterogeneous governmental program. It relates carbon 
holistically to the city through social practices and technological systems, and across the 
social and economic activities that embed urban energy use (and hence carbon generation), 
in households and their everyday lives and transport practices, and in businesses and their 
production and organisational practices. The rationality of transition is transformative yet, as 
we should anticipate, this does not suggest a coherent, singular governmental program (see 
Li 2007). Some aspects of transition suggest the recasting of technological, market and 
accumulation models to enhance the legitimacy of a low carbon economy. Other aspects 
suggest building consensus around a more radical recasting of the basis of social and 
exchange relations and systems of production (North and Longhurst, 2013). 
 3.4  Advocacy   
Advocacy represents a distinctive governmental program whose governing object is urban 
carbon governance itself, characterised by attempts to change public and political framings 
of low carbon transitions alongside more direct attempts to secure specific policy settings. 
Nearly a fifth of all initiatives in the audit included an advocacy intent. The diverse initiatives 
that constitute this program work on the affective/emotive, seeking to shift the ‘hearts and 
minds’ of both policy-makers and citizens, while also working with existing policy domains 
and approaches to enhance their carbon reduction efficacy (see Giddens, 2009). 
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Not surprisingly, advocacy is most pronounced in initiatives focused materially on energy 
infrastructure, compared to the realm of buildings or transport. The hotly contested field of 
energy policy in Australia may account for this (Daley et al, 2011). Distinct from our other 
three governmental programs, and highlighting the dispersed, ‘beyond-the-state’ nature of 
rule in of carbon governance (Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012), advocacy initiatives are 
primarily ‘non-state’ in character, being initiated by community and NGOs at much higher 
levels than across the audit as a whole. While state and federal governments are largely 
absent, as might be expected, local government does play a role both as an initiator and 
partner.  
A feature of the large majority of initiatives involving advocacy is partnership, suggesting 
that capacity and authority to govern is derived from collective rather than individual action. 
One example is the Climate Action Network which focuses on leveraging climate change 
action through community engagement, campaigning and lobbying elected officials. Notably 
though, these partnerships are primarily uniform in nature, bringing together NGO and 
community groups, sometimes with local governments, rather than drawing together a 
more diverse set of interests. Partnership then is largely about gathering momentum and 
scale, forging a political constituency behind a preferred issue framing or policy approach, 
rather than drawing in additional capabilities and capacities. Households are overwhelmingly 
the subjects of this form of carbon governance. This suggests a strong ‘consciousness-
raising’ dimension aimed to mobilise householders as active political subjects lobbying for, 
for instance, higher renewables targets, renewable energy futures, or involved in wider 
climate action campaigning. This complements (and indeed overlaps with) initiatives aimed 
at producing active carbon-reducing subjects. And these initiatives involve forms of 
governance that seek to promote technological and social innovation, positioning carbon 
reduction as requiring the technological transition and changes to social practice associated 
with embracing renewables, and the perhaps more demanding changes to social practices 
associated with demand reduction.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the dominant governance mechanisms engaged by advocacy 
initiatives are enabling, with very few initiatives involving market or provision mechanisms, 
and a very small number engaging regulatory mechanisms (e.g. voluntary targets or 
performance/evaluation tools). Reflecting the notion of building a political constituency to 
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effect enhanced carbon-reduction policy settings, these initiatives engage in explicit 
campaigning and policy influence techniques along building networks far more commonly 
than is found across the audit. Yet the uniform nature of the partnerships that activate this 
form of governance suggests challenges for the policy advocacy project in terms of building a 
wider base of support to build the legitimacy of the policy preferences.  
 
 4. Conclusion 
To conclude, we return to our opening questions: what is being sought through the 
governance of carbon in the city, how are these things being rendered and how, then, does 
carbon comes to matter in the city?  The neo-Gramscian and governmentality approach we 
deploy highlights the variety of political work being done through the urban governance of 
carbon in Australia, and the multiplicity of ways this is being driven. This approach 
problematises any conception of the emergent governance landscape as a unified policy 
space of integrated actions and aspiration, or indeed as a series of isolated initiatives. Rather 
it reveals an ecology of projects and practices and a series of emergent governmental 
programs or hegemonic projects in-the-making that relate carbon to the city in distinctive (if 
related) ways. We avoid reductive analysis that, in revealing neoliberal modes of connecting 
carbon and the city, obscures the co-presence of other means and ends of government. 
Rather our approach enables us to attend to the varied practical and material means—the 
objects, subjects and mechanisms—through which governing is enacted and is entwined 
with governmental programs/hegemonic projects. It understands these programs/projects 
as being formed not only in the abstract, through pre-determined rationalities, but in their 
workings. The objects, subjects and mechanisms through which governing is enacted are 
part of the governmental program; they are constitutive of its formation, not just 
manifestations of it. Our approach thus brings together questions of the how and why of 
governing, advancing understandings of the dynamics, multiplicity and practical enactment 
of urban carbon governance and its emergent programmatic character. 
Behaviour change is shaping a politics of responsibility aimed to make carbon ‘everyone’s 
problem’, not simply a matter for government, energy companies, or business more 
generally. This ‘development of a gathered will’ (Hinchliffe, 1996, p.6) enacts a governmental 
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logic, shaping and enrolling new forms of carbon conduct through technologies of 
performance and agency (Dean, 1999). Far from being symbolic, in its association with 
carbon behaviour change becomes an important form of governance, though its political 
logic is one among many.  Demonstration allows the state to make practical and to legitimise 
its commitment to governing carbon and to test the potential of technological interventions, 
within the ‘safe space’ of demonstration projects.  This does complex political work for 
governments. Federal and state sponsorship of major energy demonstration projects 
socialises the testing of the social and market feasibility of these technologies. Moreover, 
enacting demonstration shapes the new institutional and socio-material alignments through 
which larger scale energy infrastructure transitions might be accomplished. Meanwhile, 
demonstrating low carbon technologies via government facilities provides legitimacy and 
authority to the drive to conduct the conduct of others and so opens up a strategic space to 
intervene in the city more broadly.   
Transition involves attempts to will into existence ‘proto-low carbon economy’ and ‘proto-
low carbon society’ to work on shaping the alignments and subjects to advance these 
different visions of low carbon futures. The political work at play here revolves around how 
climate change can be made into ‘business as usual’—by generating forms of competitive 
market organization, business models and economy built on alternative systems of energy 
provision—or, alternatively, how addressing climate change might demand thorough going 
social transformation through more collectivised, cooperative responses, including 
differently structured forms of markets, transactions and economy. In the new urban politics 
of low carbon transition, the key questions are whose visions of the low carbon city will be 
allowed to count, and what socio-material alignments and subjectivities might need to be 
shaped to enable transformative visions to be accomplished.  Advocacy, in many respects, 
undertakes the conventional political work of framing an issue and keeping it on the agenda. 
This has been particularly important in the contested context of Australian carbon 
governance over the past two decades. However, while advocacy involves the fashioning of 
political constituencies, its activation primarily through NGOs and community-based groups 
suggests that it remains somewhat marginalised from other forms of governing carbon, the 
social and material alignments these evoke and the diverse mechanisms they engage.  This 
suggests it creates a relatively limited space for intervention in the city. 
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This leads us, finally, to speculate on how the emergent practices and programs of carbon 
governance might be implicated in reproducing existing governance orderings and how 
might they be capable of contributing to the shaping of new (potentially transformative) 
political orderings of governance (see Perkins 2011).  Across the inter-related governmental 
programs or hegemonic projects in-the-making we identify, we can recognise political work 
that might reproduce particular logics and the selectivity of particular social interests in the 
city (e.g. those of state authority and energy corporations via large scale technology-
focussed demonstration projects). Yet we can also recognise challenges to what it is that 
governing the urban should take into account (e.g. carbon conduct, shaping new political 
constituencies, modelling new socio-technical relations around energy via demonstration). 
Likewise, we can see both the mobilisation of individualised social subjects being enrolled 
into new forms of carbon conduct (e.g. through accounting techniques used to drive 
householders’ behaviour change) and we can see the mobilisation of collectivised, 
community subjects being enrolled in shaping new proto-low carbon societal relations (e.g. 
via community-based Transition initiatives). Finally, we can see the embedding of a carbon 
economy through the institutionalisation of competitive market logics and ‘accumulation by 
decarbonisation’ (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008) (e.g. via the creation of new markets and 
business models around alternative systems of energy provision). Yet we can also see the 
construction of other forms of carbon economy and the shaping of other kinds of markets 
that might recirculate resources within the urban economy or that enact forms of social 
economy (e.g. via Transition initiatives around local food).  
Australia’s emergent landscape of urban carbon governance involves diverse political work, 
with the work done by each distinctive governmental programs being dependent on the 
others. Our approach reveals the multiple and emergent nature of the governance 
landscape and thus the fertility of the political moment. The landscape is both reproducing 
existing governance orderings and contains openings—via emergent hegemonic projects—
that might produce more transformative political orderings: not least because of the 
demands and politics the low carbon subjects being invoked here might be empowered to 
pursue and because of the porous nature of the ‘integral state’ that is open to 
reconfiguration as new governmental programs and enacted and sedimented. Thus further 
detailed investigation of the diverse work that governing carbon in the city does and what 
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effects is has, and of how, by and for whom is governing being accomplished, is essential as 
cities strive to enact urban low carbon transitions.  
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Table 1: Characterization of governmental programs/hegemonic projects in the making 
 (Key categories are bolded where they are found at a higher proportion than across the sample as a whole) 
 
 Behaviour change Demonstration Transition Policy Advocacy 
Actors/entities as 
initiators and partners 
 Predominantly Local Government 
 Partnerships, espec. between Local 
Governments & Corporations  
 Stronger involvement of Federal 
Government    
 Less NGO involvement   
 Dominated by state actors, 
predominantly Local Government 
 Partnerships espec. betw. levels of 
state  
 Public-private partnerships  
 Less NGO involvement   
 Predominantly community 
organization partnerships in small 
scale initiatives, & 
 Largescale public-private 
partnership, involving all levels of 
government, espec. Federal  
 Strong NGO involvement  
 Predominantly NGOs and 
community-based organizations,  
 Minimal Federal or State 
Government or Corporation 
involvement 
 Partnerships, espec. with other 
NGOs & CBOs, & Local 
Government 
Subjects/spheres 
worked upon/through 
 Predominantly Households & 
Individuals  
 Some focus on Businesses, espec. 
where carbon accounting involved 
 Social Innovation & Technical 
Innovation  
 Minimal emphasis on 
Environmental Justice 
 Predominantly initiating 
organization 
 Less focus on households and 
businesses, 
 Technical Innovation  
 Some emphasis on Social 
Innovation  
 Minimal emphasis on 
Environmental Justice 
 Predominantly Households & 
Individuals 
 Some focus on Businesses 
 Technical Innovation and Social 
Innovation  
 Minimal emphasis on 
Environmental Justice 
 Predominantly households  
 Some focus on own organisation 
and businesses  
 Social Innovation and Technical 
Innovation  
 Little emphasis on Environmental 
Justice 
Objects/material 
worked upon/through 
 Predominantly Buildings, espec. 
energy efficient materials & design, 
building integrated renewable 
energy 
 Energy Infrastructure, espec. 
renewables & demand reduction 
 Where Transport is worked on, 
individual motorized transport 
 
 Predominantly Buildings, espec. 
energy efficient materials & 
design, new-build & retrofitted 
energy efficient technologies, & 
building-integrated renewable or 
low carbon energy 
 Where Energy Infrastructure is 
worked on, renewables, street 
lighting & low carbon energy 
supply 
 Where Transport is worked on, 
municipal fleets, mass transit 
 Predominantly Energy 
Infrastructure, espec. renewables   
 Where Buildings are worked on, 
espec. building-integrated 
renewables, retrofitted energy 
efficiency technologies 
 Little focus on Transport, but 
predominantly motorized individual 
transport  
  
 Predominantly Energy 
Infrastructure  
 Where Transport is worked on, 
espec. mass transit   
 Little focus on Buildings, but 
predominantly demand reduction 
and energy efficiency  
Mechanisms  Predominantly Enabling, espec. 
education schemes, audits  
 Predominantly Enabling, espec. 
demonstration, technical 
 Predominantly Enabling, espec. 
expertise/advice, information 
 Predominantly Enabling, espec. 
building networks, policy advocacy, 
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 Less emphasis on building 
networks, campaigning, influencing 
policy  
 Some use of Market mechanisms, 
espec. subsidies, purchase 
agreements, incentives 
 Some use of Regulation 
mechanisms 
 Some use of Provision mechanisms, 
espec. free services 
innovation, information 
generation, best practice  
 Less emphasis on information 
sharing, advocacy, influencing 
policy  
 Some use of Provision, espec. 
infrastructure 
 Some use of Regulation, espec. 
voluntary targets, certification 
 Some use of Market mechanisms, 
espec. subsidies, revolving funds, 
loans   
sharing & generation, building 
networks, influencing policy, 
advocacy 
 Some use of Market mechanisms, 
espec. subsidies 
 Stronger use of Provision 
mechanisms   
 Some use of Regulation 
mechanisms  
campaigning, travel demand 
management 
 Minimal use of regulation, market 
or provision mechanisms 
 
